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Abstract 
The European elections in 2014 were the first to be held after a long period in which EU-related news was prominent in 
the media. They were held after years of daily news about the euro crisis and after months of news about the popular 
uprising in the Ukraine against president Yanukovych, who had refused to sign the association agreement with the EU. 
This could have invited political parties to overcome the usual problem of low salience of EU issues by strongly profiling 
themselves on EU issues. Turnout at the 2014 EU elections, however, remained low, hinting that parties were unable to 
convert the attention for European issues into enthusiasm for their party at the European elections. This paper asks 
how vote choice was influenced by party campaigning on EU related issues. A news effects analysis based on a content 
analysis of Dutch newspapers and television, and on a panel survey among Dutch voters revealed that EU issues func-
tioned as wedge issues: the more strongly parties were associated in the news with the euro crisis and the Ukraine, the 
less they succeeded in mobilizing voters. 
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1. Introduction 
“Hier schlägt das Herz europäisch und dieser Herz-
schlag, der hier europäisch schlägt, wird auch bei uns 
in Europa, in Deutschland, in Berlin gehört. Uns ist 
das Schicksal der Ukraine nicht gleichgültig” [Here 
the heart beats European, and this heartbeat, which 
sounds European, is heard by us in Europe, in Ger-
many, in Berlin. We are not indifferent to the fate of 
Ukraine]. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido 
Westerwelle in his speech to protesters at Euro-
maidan, December 4th 2013  
For the first time in the history of European elections 
since 1979, EU related news was prominent in news-
paper and television news in the months preceding the 
European Elections of May 2014. Developments in the 
Ukraine became the foremost important topic in the 
news due to the popular uprising against president 
Yanukovych, who had cancelled the Ukraine’s associa-
tion treaty with the EU. News about EU support for the 
revolt followed, for example news about the visits to 
Euromaidan of among others the German foreign min-
ister Westerwelle and MEP Verhofstadt in December 
2013. The news media provided extensive coverage of 
president Yanukovych’s retreat in February 2014, the 
signing of the political part of the association treaty be-
tween the EU and the new government in Kiev on 
March 21th 2014, the annexation of the Crimean pen-
insula and the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. EU re-
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lated news on the Ukraine came on top of EU related 
news about the financial crisis of 2007−2008 and the 
euro crisis of 2010−2012.  
On the basis of the increase in EU related news one 
could have expected that political parties would have 
been able to convert the massive attention for Europe-
an issues into enthusiasm for the EU issue positions of 
their party at the European elections: many studies 
showed or at least suggested that a poor EU visibility as 
indicated by a low amount of EU related news in previ-
ous EU election campaigns contributed to a low turn-
out in earlier EU elections (De Vreese, 2003; De Vreese, 
Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006; Lefevere & 
Van Aelst, 2014; Schuck, Vliegenthart, & De Vreese, 
2016; Schuck, Xezonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci, & De 
Vreese, 2011; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014; Wilke & 
Reinemann, 2005). The research question of this article 
is how vote choice was influenced by parties’ profiling 
on EU related issues. In what direction and to what ex-
tent was the vote for a party affected by the news cov-
erage of that party’s stance on EU issues such as sup-
port for the EU debt nations to solve the euro crisis; or 
a treaty with the Ukraine, against the will of Russia?  
This study adds to the recent literature which 
shows that issue voting matters in a European context 
(e.g. Hobolt & Spoon, 2012; Van de Wardt, De Vries, & 
Hobolt, 2014) and to the literature on effects of the vis-
ibility and the tone of EU related news (e.g. Azrout, Van 
Spanje, & De Vreese, 2012; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 
2014). The unique contribution is to show that the am-
plification of parties’ issue positions on EU related is-
sues in the news media matters for electoral support—
albeit not in a straightforward “more is better” fashion. 
2. The Ukraine and the Euro Crisis in the 2014 EU 
Election Campaign 
The Netherlands is an interesting case to study the im-
pact of the attention for European issues, because of 
strong variation over time. In the years before the Dutch 
‘no’ to the European constitutional treaty in 2005 the EU 
was not an important or controversial issue in the news. 
During the euro crisis enthusiasm for the EU diminished 
further. The declining enthusiasm for EU politics can be 
seen from Figure 1, which shows the decrease in turnout 
from 58.1% in 1979 down to 36.8% in 2009. 
Figure 1 shows also the development of EU-
visibility for Dutch citizens, as indicated by the amount 
of news coverage on the EU in De Telegraaf, which is the 
most popular newspaper in The Netherlands.1 Although  
                                                          
1 De Telegraaf is the Dutch newspaper with the widest circula-
tion, also among the lower educated segments of Dutch society. 
It’s also the newspaper with the highest impact on politics, as 
measured by the number of Parliamentary questions based on 
news reports, and it is the only newspaper for which digital con-
tent is available from 1979 onwards is available. Attention for 
the EU in De Telegraaf was measured in each EU election year by 
the number of news articles about the EU and EU institutions in 
the five months preceding the EU elections, as operationalized 
by means of a search query (cf. Appendix) in the Amsterdam 
Content Analysis Toolkit AMCAT (Van Atteveldt, 2008, cf. 
https://amcat.vu.nl/navigator and https://github.com/amcat). 
 
Figure 1. EU visibility in the news preceding the EU elections (5 months) and turnout. EU visibility is defined as the 
amount of EU news items, as indicated by the number of news items on the EU in De Telegraaf, divided by 10 to arrive 
at a better scale for visualization. 
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turnout is related to increases or decreases in EU related 
news, turnout increased only marginally from 36.8% in 
2009 to 37.3% in 2014, in spite of the unprecedented 
amount of EU related news in 2014. Figure 1 shows a 
long-term negative relationship between the level of EU 
visibility and EU turnout (r=-0.35) in combination with a 
positive short-term relationship between their first-
order differences (r=+0.48). This suggests that voters 
who were not made enthusiastic by any of the political 
parties in a previous EU election, tend to stay less than 
enthusiastic, which is known as habitual (non-)voting in 
the research literature (Franklin & Hobolt, 2011). In 
1999 both turnout and EU visibility were very low, but 
the news was nevertheless soaked with complaints 
about the “Brussels bureaucracy,” without explaining 
what the Dutch parties, let alone the Dutch voters, 
could do about it. 
Figure 1 illustrates the central puzzle of this article: 
why did parties not mobilize their voters on the new 
EU issues in 2014, given the unprecedented amount of 
EU news in 2014? We focus on the vote for individual 
parties rather than on turnout, because this will show 
whether a specific party’s profile with respect to the 
new EU issues can affect the mobilization of voters for 
that party. 
2.1. Electoral Consequences of Party Emphasis on  
EU Issues 
Party contestation at the national level is often more 
attractive for national political parties than competi-
tion on EU issues, even in EU election campaigns (Van 
der Eijk & Franklin, 2004). This is especially true for a 
multiparty system with coalition governments like the 
Netherlands. Research from Adam et al. (2014) on par-
ty press releases in the twelve weeks that preceded the 
2014 European elections shows that only 7% of the 
Dutch press releases were devoted to international af-
fairs, as compared to 16% of German press releases 
(Adam et al., 2014). EU issues may drive a wedge with-
in the electorate of a party and within the governing 
coalition in a multiparty system. Competition on EU is-
sues is primarily used by parties who have never been 
part of government coalitions (Van de Wardt et al., 
2014). In combination with the tendency of media to 
concentrate on negative news, this results in the para-
dox that more media attention for Europe may be det-
rimental for trust in Europe (Van Noije, 2010; Van 
Spanje & De Vreese, 2014; Vliegenthart, Schuck, 
Boomgaarden, & De Vreese, 2008).  
The 2005 Dutch referendum on the EU constitution 
provides an example. Months before the vested politi-
cal parties started their short pro-EU campaign, news-
papers and television news programs came to report 
extensively about the expected French “no” because of 
the French fear for cheap labor from Eastern Europe. 
This huge increase in media attention for the EU long 
before the official campaign contributed to the shift 
from a pro-European stance towards the Dutch “no” to 
the EU constitutional treaty (Kleinnijenhuis, Takens, & 
Van Atteveldt, 2006). This shows the weak role of 
Dutch political parties in the news about European af-
fairs. In the terminology of Koopmans and Erbe (2004) 
the low involvement of national actors in European af-
fairs is described as weak vertical Europeanisation. Al-
most all news about the euro crisis was either suprana-
tional, with reports about the ECB and the EFSF, or 
horizontal, with extensive reports about street riots in 
Athens, the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany, and 
long-term interest rates for Spain. The prolongation of 
the euro crisis culminated in disappointment about EU 
austerity politics and lower levels of trust (Armingeon & 
Ceka, 2015). EU news related to Ukraine was also highly 
horizontal. The media covered soundbites from Euro-
maidan and from the speeches of the Russian president 
Vladimir Putin. Images from the battleground in the 
Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine became an integral part 
of prime time television news. Contentious European is-
sues like the Ukraine conflict are often covered widely 
even in the tabloid press (Pfetsch, Adam, & Eschner, 
2010). The vertical dimension in EU news was once more 
weak, presumably because political parties were afraid 
of their voters. The popular mood was against Putin, but 
popular resistance against EU membership for the 
Ukraine could be expected to be even stronger than in 
the case of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.  
Hypothesis 1 is based on the expectation that if a 
party strongly emphasizes the EU, the euro crisis, or 
the Ukraine, these issues would turn into wedge issues 
(Van de Wardt et al., 2014), chasing off a significant 
part of its voters. A party’s emphasis on an issue, or in 
other words, a party’s involvement in an issue, or a 
party’s association with an issue in the media used by a 
voter will be indicated by the number of news items in 
which the party and the issue co-occur in the media 
used by that voter. 
H1: News coverage of a party’s involvement in  
the EU (H1a), the euro crisis (H1b), or the crisis  
in the Ukraine (H1c) in the media used by a voter 
diminishes that voter’s likelihood to vote for the 
party. 
2.2. Electoral Consequences of Party Emphasis on Old 
Issue Dimensions 
To test whether the vote at EU elections depends on 
the media portrayal of the involvement of parties in 
European issues, news on national issue dimensions 
has to be considered in addition. In line with theories 
of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave, Lefevere, 
& Tresch, 2012) and theories of issue news effects 
(Kleinnijenhuis, Van Hoof, Oegema, & De Ridder, 2007; 
Walgrave, Lefevere, & Nuytemans, 2009) it is to be ex-
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pected that parties who receive media attention for 
their issue positions on owned issues, either on the 
left-right dimension (e.g. taxes, social services) or on 
the cultural dimension (e.g. immigration, Islam) will 
profit at the elections. Therefore news coverage in the 
media used by a voter of a party’s stances on the left-
right dimension is expected to increase that voter’s 
likelihood to vote for that party. The same is expected 
to hold for news about the cultural GALTAN dimension 
(Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006, 
2008), although the latter is more often debated (Van 
der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009).  
H2: News coverage of a party’s involvement with 
the left-right dimension (H2a) and/or the cultural 
dimension (H2b) in the media used by a voter 
increases that voter’s likelihood to vote for the 
party. 
We will test whether addressing these common issue 
dimensions resulted in additional votes, without test-
ing in more detail whether parties emphasized indeed 
‘their’ side of ideological dimensions in line with issue 
ownership theory (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 
1996; Walgrave et al., 2012). 
2.3. Electoral Impact of Characteristics of Voters and 
Parties 
We now turn from the supply side of news on EU issues 
in the media to the demand side of voters who select a 
party also on the basis of structural factors that play a 
role in second-order elections, in which votes “are de-
termined more by the domestic political cleavages than 
by alternatives originating in the EU” (Reif & Schmitt, 
1980). Voting on the basis of domestic political cleav-
ages leads however to conflicting considerations.  
First of all, many voters vote habitually in European 
elections (Hobolt & Spoon, 2012), based on the party 
voted for in the last national elections, thus on the basis 
of prior vote intentions (Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014).  
H3a: Voters tend to vote in European elections  
for the same party as in the preceding national 
elections. 
Issue voting may however be more prevalent in Euro-
pean elections than in national elections, since strate-
gic considerations about party size and coalition poten-
tial matter less in second-order elections (Hobolt & 
Spoon, 2012; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk & 
Franklin, 1996). In EU elections voters tend to cast a 
sincere vote for the party whose issue positions they 
like best. The 2014 elections for the European Parlia-
ment were held in the mid-term of the national legisla-
tive period in the Netherlands. Therefore voters who 
are disappointed with the party they voted for in the 
previous national elections, will presumably vote for a 
nearby party with which they also agree on the issues 
(Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014; Kleinnijenhuis & 
Fan, 1999; Van der Eijk, Schmitt, & Binder, 2005; Van 
der Meer, Van Elsas, Lubbe, & Van der Brug, 2015). In 
line with the theory of issue ownership we assume that 
agreement with a party matters especially on issues 
that are associated with a party by voters (Walgrave et 
al., 2012). 
H3b: Voters tend to vote for the party with which 
they agree on the issues that they associate with 
that party. 
Dissatisfied voters in second-order elections tend not 
to vote, and especially not to vote for government coa-
lition parties (Johnston & Pattie, 2001; Reif & Schmitt, 
1980): “Parties in national governments do worse in EP 
elections, especially when the EP elections take place 
during the middle of the national election cycle” 
(Hobolt & Spoon, 2012, p. 703). 
H3c: Voters are less likely to vote for a government 
party than for an opposition party in European 
elections. 
In addition to taking part in the national government, 
subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the na-
tional government has been identified as a major de-
terminant of the vote in second-order elections like the 
EU elections (Hix & Marsh, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; 
Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). 
H3d,e: The greater a voter’s dissatisfaction with 
government performance, the less likely he or she 
will vote for any party (H3d), and especially for a 
government party (H3e). 
Education and political knowledge will be included as 
control variables, since a low level of education and a 
poor political knowledge lead a lack of enthusiasm to 
vote for any party in elections for the European Parlia-
ment (Lefevere & Van Aelst, 2014). 
3. Method 
3.1. Content Analysis: Data 
The tests of the hypotheses on news effects (H1 and 
H2) are based on an automated content analysis of 
news attention from December 2013 until the EU elec-
tions at May 22nd 2014, and on a two-wave panel sur-
vey shortly before and immediately after the EU elec-
tions. Seven national newspapers (Algemeen Dagblad, 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Metro, NRC Handelsblad, 
Next, Spits, De Telegraaf, de Volkskrant and Trouw), a 
free daily (Metro) and NOS television news from the 
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public broadcaster were included in the analysis. The 
Netherlands is traditionally a nation with a high reader-
ship of national newspapers. Even though this has now 
dropped to about 50%, in combination with public tel-
evision news the media analyzed here still reach three 
quarters of the Dutch voters.  
3.1.1. Content Analysis: Operationalization 
The automated content analysis is conducted using 
AmCAT (Van Atteveldt, 2008) using search queries for 
each of the parties, for the left-right dimension, the 
cultural dimension, the EU, the financial crisis and the 
Ukraine conflict. These queries are based on a combi-
nation of more elementary concepts, such as crime, 
and immigration in the case of the cultural dimension. 
The query formulation procedure that was used to op-
timize both precision (the percentage of found articles 
that were correct) and recall (the percentage of all cor-
rect articles that was found) gave good results, because 
the media happen to use fairly unique names and la-
bels to denote Ukraine, the euro crisis, and political 
parties. The resulting search queries are included in the 
supplementary materials.  
Co-occurrences in a single news items were used to 
assess whether a party addressed an issue. It should be 
noted that this measure overestimates the frequency 
with which parties address an issue, since parties and is-
sues may co-occur in a single news item also for other 
reasons. Co-occurrence in the same news item of a party 
and an issue can be conceived as a necessary condition 
for coverage of a party’s issue position on that issue.  
3.2. Panel Survey Data 
The authors commissioned a panel survey to the Dutch 
branch of GfK, an international market research organ-
ization. 1806 respondents for the first wave of the 
panel study in July 2012 were drawn from a GfK data-
base of over 50,000 respondents that had agreed to 
participate in GfK-research. The sample of 1806 re-
spondents was effectively a stratified sample that 
guaranteed that the sample would be not only a repre-
sentative sample with regard to socio-demographic 
variables (age, sex, education), but also with regard to 
turnout and party choice in the 2010 elections. Re-
spondents from this sample were asked to participate 
in a new wave shortly before (n=1233, response rate 
68%) to assess their media use and immediately after 
the EU elections to retrieve their vote (n=1160, response 
rate 64%). New voters who were not of voting age in 
2012 were excluded. The 2014 sample was still a repre-
sentative sample with regard to almost all demographic 
and political characteristics, with political knowledge 
and turnout as notable examples. Panel attrition oc-
curred significantly more often among respondents with 
a lower political knowledge (as measured in the first 
wave of the panel survey in July 2012), which explains 
why turnout according to the post-election sample 
(65%) is significantly higher than actual turnout 
(37.3%)—as is the case in almost every panel survey. 
Since the remaining variance in education, knowledge 
and turnout is still large, the panel survey data are still 
perfectly suited to test explanations of party choice at 
the European Elections2 since education and political 
knowledge can be included as control variables. 
3.2.1. Linking Media Content to Respondents in the 
Panel Survey 
For each of the media for which automated content 
analysis data were available a question was asked in the 
panel survey whether the respondent had made use of 
them during the last week. To the users who used a spe-
cific medium we attributed the content analysis data for 
that medium with regard to the emphasis of each party 
on the EU, the euro crisis, the Ukraine, the left-right di-
mension and the cultural dimension, in line with for ex-
ample Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, and De Vreese 
(2011) and Kleinnijenhuis, Van Hoof, and Oegema 
(2006). To users who used more than one medium we 
attributed the sum of the attention scores for the media 
used. Additional news items are expected to show di-
minishing impact, which is often modeled with taking 
logs or square roots of the number of news items. In line 
with earlier research we opted for square roots (Van 
Noije, Kleinnijenhuis, & Oegema, 2008). The content 
analysis data that were attributed to each respondent 
provide the best possible measure of the news about a 
party’s involvement in various issue domains in the me-
dia of individual voters, although the measure still ne-
glects which respondent skipped how many relevant 
news items from the media that were used. 
3.2.2. Operationalisation of Panel Survey Variables 
Party choice in the 2014 EU elections was measured in 
the 2014 post-election survey wave (n=1160). Re-
spondents were asked whether they had voted, and if 
so, for which party. Party choice in 2012 was measured 
as the party one intended to vote for in the first pre-
election wave before the national elections of 2012 ra-
                                                          
2 Due to panel attrition the percentage of newspaper readers 
increased from 51% to 55%, and the percentage voters who ei-
ther read a newspaper or watched public television broadcasts 
at least once a week from 73% to 77%. The latter percentages 
are based on the question whether the respondent used these 
media during the last week, which still overestimates the actu-
al use. The unweighted percentage of 35% abstainers in the 
post second-order election survey is a good percentage, that is 
comparable with the weighted percentage of 45% of abstain-
ers in the 2009 EU elections in the Netherlands, which was ob-
tained by reweighting the data on socio-demographic charac-
teristics (cf. Lefevere and Van Aelst, 2014, Table 2). 
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ther than with a 2014 recall measure. Satisfaction with 
government policy was measured by a single 5-point 
scale, that was re-scaled to the -1…+1-value range. In-
cumbency was measured with a -1…+1-scale, in which 
the maximum score of 1 was assigned to the govern-
ment coalition parties PvdA and VVD, a zero to “loyal 
opposition” parties CU/SGP and D66, and -1 to the re-
maining opposition parties. Last but not least the 
agreement on issues between a voter and a party was 
measured with questions about the association between 
specific parties and specific issues according to a voter. 
Respondents were asked: ‘Which of the issues below 
comes to your mind first if you think about < party i >? 
And which issue next?’ Respondents could choose from 
a list of predefined newsworthy issues and were also 
able to add other issues. Respondents who associated a 
party with a specific issue were asked: ‘To what degree 
do you agree or disagree with <party i> with regard to 
<issue j1 | issue j2>’ (Kleinnijenhuis & Pennings, 2001). A 
5-point scale was used (disagree fully, disagree, neither 
agree nor disagree, agree, agree fully), which was linear-
ly transformed to a -1…+1 value range. Overall issue 
agreement of a voter with a party was measured as the 
average agreement with a party across all issues that 
were associated with that party. Note that this meas-
urement in terms of associative issue ownership 
(Walgrave et al., 2012) applies both to position issues 
and valence issues (Hobolt & Spoon, 2012). The control 
variable education and political knowledge were meas-
ured respectively as the highest education that one fin-
ished and as the number of correct answers to twelve fac-
tual questions about the recognition of four politicians 
from photos. The three questions per politician dealt with 
their name, their party affiliation, and their political func-
tion (Cronbach’s  = 0.75). Education and political 
knowledge were linearly transformed to a 0…1-scale to 
render their logistic regression coefficients comparable. 
3.3. Data Analysis 
A multilevel logistic regression analysis is applied to 
test the hypotheses on potential causes of the decision 
whether or not to vote for any single party.3 
4. Results 
4.1. Voter Characteristics, Exposure to Media Content, 
and Party Choice 
Table 1 gives an overview of the mean scores of the 
variables that will be used to test the hypotheses. 
Mean scores are presented for abstainers and for the 
voters of each of the parties in 2014. 
Average scores for the abstainers are included in the 
first row of Table 1. According to the post-election wave 
34% of the voters did not cast a vote in the EU 2014 
elections. In the 2012 national elections 20% of the vot-
ers abstained. The average educational level (0.56), the 
average level of political knowledge (0.79), and news 
exposure (0.48) of the abstainers in the 2014 EU election 
are low as compared to 2014 EU voters. Their dissatis-
faction with government policy (-0.25) is surpassed only 
by voters for the leftist SP and the rightist PVV.  
                                                          
3 A multilevel logistic regression analyses on “stacked” data with 
combinations of parties and respondents as the units of analy-
sis is to be preferred over a multinomial regression analysis on 
“wide” data with respondents as the units of analysis. The in-
dependent news variables about the emphasis that a party 
puts on an issue should predict only the dichotomous choice 
for that party, and should not be allowed to exert all types of 
side-effects on the decision to make a choice between other 
parties. This is guaranteed with a multilevel logistic regression 
analysis, and not with a multinomial regression analysis.  
Table 1. Means of dependent variable and independent variables for abstainers and voters for each party average ex-
posure to political issues of voters in the EU 2014 elections for each party based on their media use. 
    
Voter characteristics 
 
Exposure of voters for party to issue 
associations of party 
  party 
choice 
EU 
2014 
party 
choice 
2012 
educa-
tion 
knowledge gvmt sat-
isfaction 
[-1..+1] 
news ex-
posure 
[0..1] 
 left-
right 
cultural EU euro 
crisis 
Ukraine 
Total 100% 100% 0.56 0.79 -0.25 0.60 
 
- - - - - 
abstention 34% 20% 0.48 0.68 -0.33 0.48 
 
- - - - - 
turnout, party voted for: 
      
 
       SP (Socialists) 9% 14% 0.50 0.82 -0.64 0.65 
 
20 20 16 7 9 
  GroenLinks (Ecologists) 5% 3% 0.76 0.88 -0.26 0.67 
 
17 17 15 7 8 
  PvdA (Social-Democrats) 8% 11% 0.63 0.92 0.06 0.79 
 
43 40 31 13 20 
  ChristenUnie (Christian) 3% 3% 0.59 0.82 -0.09 0.52 
 
19 17 14 6 9 
  D66 (cultural liberal) 10% 6% 0.66 0.84 -0.01 0.66 
 
26 25 21 8 12 
  CDA (Christian) 10% 7% 0.58 0.87 -0.15 0.67 
 
28 27 23 9 12 
  VVD (socio-ec. right) 7% 15% 0.71 0.89 0.28 0.69 
 
40 41 34 14 22 
  PVV (cultural right) 8% 6% 0.48 0.77 -0.56 0.64 
 
24 37 27 10 15 
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The parties are roughly ordered from left (SP) to right 
(PVV). Habitual turnout as measured by the percentage 
of a party’s 2014 EU voters who voted for the same par-
ty at the EU elections of 2009 is lowest for the parties at 
the extremes, thus for the SP and PVV. Education, 
knowledge, government satisfaction and news exposure 
are also relatively low for voters of the SP and PVV. Edu-
cation is highest for GroenLinks (0.76), but voters for the 
PvdA exhibit on average the highest news exposure 
(0.79) and the highest political knowledge (0.92).  
The final five columns in Table 1 show average expo-
sure to political issues of voters in the EU 2014 elections 
for each party based on their media use. They are not 
based on all voters. Table 1 shows, for example, that 
PVV voters, given their media use, could have encoun-
tered on average 37 news items in which the PVV played 
the drum of cultural issues—e.g. the Islam—from De-
cember 1st 2013 until the elections on May 22nd 2014. 
A comparison per row shows that the PVV addressed 
the cultural dimension more often than any other issue 
according to the media that were consumed by PVV 
voters. A comparison per column shows that the gov-
ernment coalition parties PvdA and VVD addressed the 
cultural dimension even more often according to the 
media that were followed by PvdA-voters, respectively 
VVD-voters. The left-wing PvdA focuses slightly more on 
the left-right dimension than on the cultural dimension 
(43 vs 40) whereas the reverse holds for the VVD (40 vs 
41). The government parties take the lead also in ad-
dressing EU issues. Table 1 shows that the media that 
were used by voters of the opposition parties SP, 
GroenLinks, and ChristenUnie do not pay a lot of atten-
tion to the new euro crisis or the Ukraine.  
4.2. Assessing the Effect of EU Related News Controlled 
for Other Factors 
Table 2 shows logistic regression coefficients that rep-
resent the effects of news about the issue positions of 
parties on the vote for a party. Model 1 is the empty 
model that is included to enable a comparison of 
goodness-of-fit measures AIC and DIC. Model 2 in-
cludes only voter and party characteristics (hypothesis 
3). Model 3 includes also the effects of the emphasis of 
parties on the left-right dimension and the cultural di-
mension according to the media (hypothesis 2) and the 
effects of a party’s emphasis on the euro crisis and the 
Ukraine according to the media (hypothesis 1). 
The decreasing AIC and DIC scores show that model 
3 fits the data better than model 2, which in turn fits 
the data better than model 1. This implies that news 
about party positions on the EU partially explain EP 
vote choice, also when controlling for news about par-
ty positions on the left-right dimension and the cultural 
dimension, and for structural characteristics of voters 
and parties. 
4.2.1. Controls for Structural Determinants of the Vote 
in Second-Order Elections 
The direction of the significant regression coefficients 
in both model 2 and model 3 in Table 2 confirm expec-
tations that voters consider national political cleavages 
when voting in second-order elections. The decision to 
Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression to trace the influence of news on a party’s issue profile on the vote. 
 
      
1: empty model  2: with party × voter 
 
3:with party profile in media 
used by voter 
   B SE sig  B SE sig B SE sig 
intercept   -2.522 0.040 *** 
 
-4.461 0.246 *** 
 
-4.662 0.257 *** 
controls 
            
 
education 
     
0.735 0.183 *** 
 
0.741 0.185 *** 
 
political knowledge 
     
0.711 0.259 ** 
 
0.608 0.270 * 
vote choice as 2nd order elections 
            
 
H3a national party choice 2012 
     
2.399 0.107 *** 
 
2.413 0.107 *** 
 
H3b issue agreement 
     
1.783 0.124 *** 
 
1.774 0.124 *** 
 
H3c incumbent coalition party 
     
-0.444 0.125 *** 
 
-0.278 0.196 
 
 
H3d satisfaction government policy 
     
0.437 0.100 *** 
 
0.450 0.101 *** 
 
H3e incumbent × satisfaction  
     
0.680 0.111 *** 
 
0.719 0.113 *** 
issue profile party in media used by the voter 
          
 
H1a EU 
         
0.041 0.053 
 
 
H1b financial crisis / euro crisis 
         
-0.279 0.070 *** 
 
H1c Ukraine 
         
-0.164 0.042 *** 
 
H2a left vs right dimension 
         
0.052 0.019 ** 
 H2b cultural dimension   
       
0.094 0.029 ** 
random part, variance 
            
 
across respondents (n=1160) 
 
0.000 
   
0.000 
   
0.000 
  goodness of fit    
          
 
AIC 
  
4917.9 
   
3276.4 
   
3250.0 
   DIC   4913.9 
   
3258.4 
   
3222.0 
  Note: n= 8 parties x 1160 respondents; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p< 0.05, .p< 0.1 two-sided. 
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vote for a specific party is influenced strongly by habitual 
voting (Franklin & Hobolt, 2011), as measured by whether 
one voted already for the same party in the 2012 na-
tional elections (H3a). Voting by heart on the basis of 
agreement on political issues with the party to be voted 
for matters strongly in second-order elections (H3b). Vot-
ers who are disappointed with their previous party will 
not vote for an arbitrary other party but for a party with 
which they agree on political issues (Dassonneville & 
Dejaeghere, 2014; Kleinnijenhuis & Fan, 1999; Van der 
Meer et al., 2015). Satisfaction with government policy 
reveals the straightforward interaction effect that espe-
cially parties that take part in the coalition part will be 
rewarded in case of satisfaction and punished in case of 
dissatisfaction, in line with the literature on retrospec-
tive voting (Johnston & Pattie, 2001; Van der Brug, Van 
der Eijk, & Franklin, 2007) (H3c, H3d and H3e). The con-
trols for levels of education and knowledge show that 
these important predictors of turnout in second-order 
elections (Lefevere & Van Aelst, 2014) increase the like-
lihood to vote for each of the parties. 
4.2.2. Effects of Political News 
Model 3 shows that news matters along with these 
structural determinants of party choice in second-order 
elections. The significant logistic regression coefficients 
show that reports in the media used by voter about par-
ty positioning on the left-right dimension (H2a) and on 
the cultural dimension (H2b) increase the likelihood to 
vote for these parties. The most likely underlying mech-
anism is that voters will reward parties who succeed in 
getting media coverage for their owned issues, which 
are usually either left or right (Budge & Farlie, 1983), or 
either Green, Alternative and Libertarian or Traditional, 
Authoritarian and Nationalist (Hooghe et al., 2002).  
Because national parties are not portrayed as pow-
erful players in EU news, we expected a negative effect 
on the vote of the news about parties addressing the 
EU, the euro crisis, or the Ukraine conflict. No effect 
shows up for addressing the EU (H1a). Negative boom-
erang effects show up for addressing the euro crisis 
(H1b) and the Ukraine conflict (H1c), as is indicated by 
the significantly negative logistic regression coeffi-
cients. Thus, hypothesis H1 is confirmed, and the puz-
zle why parties did not mobilize their voters on the 
new EU issues in spite of an explosion of EU news is 
solved. In the news effects model 3 the direct negative 
effect of incumbency on the vote in second-order elec-
tions (H3c) becomes insignificant, which suggests that 
the negative effect of incumbency on the vote is medi-
ated by involvement of the governing parties in news 
about EU related issues, which makes them unpopular. 
We now turn to the random part to assess the vari-
ance of regression coefficients. The variation in the 
random intercept across respondents is remarkably 
small. We tested also a model with random intercepts 
across parties and a random slope model with party-
specific habitual voting, which showed the same posi-
tive and negative signs for the regression coefficients.4 
4.2.3. Conditional Effect of News about a Party’s Stance 
on the Ukraine 
Multilevel logistic regression estimates often give a 
poor impression of the marginal effects of separate 
variables in the model, even when different explanato-
ry variables have the value range as in Table 2. To illus-
trate effect size, Figure 2 presents a linear plot of the 
effect of a party’s emphasis on the Ukraine on the 
probability to vote for that party. The X-axis shows the 
association between a party and the Ukraine in the news 
followed by voters of that party, while the Y-axis shows 
the logarithmic transformation of the probability to vote 
for that party, with all other variables set to their means. 
The distribution of news about the profiles of parties is 
shown on the x-axis by means of small, more or less 
densely plotted, vertical bars. 
Even when controlled for other variables the prob-
ability to vote for a party decreases from 20% for a 
theoretical party that did not address the Ukraine at 
all, down to far less than 1% for a theoretical party that 
addresses the Ukraine at every occasion.  
For a further interpretation of Figure 2 it is worth-
while to consider the average emphasis of individual 
parties according to the news media that were followed 
by their voters on the x-axis, as presented in the last col-
umn in Table 1. Given average values on other variables, 
VVD voters would have been assigned a probability of 
roughly 1% only to vote for the governing VVD given the 
high amount of Ukraine related EU news (n=22 news 
items on average) about the VVD. The likelihood to vote 
for the Christian-Democrats (CDA), the Socialist Party 
(SP) or GroenLinks would amount to almost 5%, since 
these opposition parties were more able to avoid the 
Ukraine (n=8, 9 news items, respectively). All in all Figure 
2 shows that the negative effect of party-related news 
on the Ukraine on the EU vote is quite substantial. 
                                                          
4 A model with random intercepts per party hardly converges, 
but shows the same direction of regression coefficients as in 
model 3 from Table 2, but with insignificant coefficients for 
news effects and incumbency effects. The reason for the latter 
is that incumbency and party emphasis on issues can be pre-
dicted almost perfectly from party names. A random slope 
model with random slopes for habitual voting per party is theo-
retically more interesting and less multicollinear from an empiri-
cal point of view. This gives a model with an improved goodness 
of fit (DIC=3151) as compared to model 3 (DIC=3222). Habitual 
voting shows to be particularly strong for the parties of the 
Christian party family, CDA and CU/SGP, which is in line with 
what most political observers believe. In this model the nega-
tive effects of addressing the Euro crisis or the Ukraine conflict 
remain significant, in addition to a marginal significant effect 
for emphasizing the cultural dimension.  
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Figure 2. Effect of number of news items about a party and the Ukraine in one’s media on the probability to vote for party 
(logarithmic scale). Note: The effects are conditional on mean values for the remaining independent variables and for the 
random intercept in the multilevel regression model of Table 2. The grey area denotes the 95% confidence interval. 
5. Discussion 
One can wonder why the explosion of EU related news 
on the euro crisis and the Ukraine conflict before the 
2014 EU elections hardly resulted in a higher enthusi-
asm for the EU positions of political parties, as shown 
by the very low increase of turnout (cf. Figure 1). The 
puzzle why this did not occur in 2014 can be solved by 
looking at the micro-level effects of media coverage on 
the individual vote.  
The current study confirms that issue voting in a 
European context matters (e.g. Hobolt & Spoon, 2012; 
Van de Wardt et al., 2014). The study shows news ef-
fects, in line with the literature on effects of the visibil-
ity and the tone of EU related news (e.g. Azrout et al., 
2012; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). The unique con-
tribution of this study is to provide empirical evidence 
that amplification of parties’ issue positions on EU re-
lated issues in the news media actually diminished 
electoral support. The emphasis of parties on the euro 
crisis and the Ukraine did not motivate voters but 
scared them off, when controlled for structural charac-
teristics of voters and parties, and for addressing the 
traditional left-right dimension and the cultural dimen-
sion. The result that a party’s emphasis on the left-right 
dimension and the cultural dimension in the media 
motivates voters to vote for that party is in line with 
survey research that established the importance of the 
left-right dimension in EU elections (Hobolt & Spoon, 
2012). The result that the EU’s relation with Ukraine 
and the euro crisis can’t be addressed by parties in the 
news media without losing voters is in line with survey 
research which showed that the EU is a wedge issue in 
multiparty systems (Van de Wardt et al., 2014).  
A limitation of this study that we focused on issue 
news and on retrospective voting based on satisfaction 
with government policy, but not on news about sup-
port and criticism, and cooperation and conflict, or 
about success and failures, losses and benefits, and the 
horse race, which also exerts effects on the vote 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007; Schuck et al., 2016; Van 
Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). 
Political parties were not portrayed in the media as 
relevant players in the Euro crisis and the Ukraine con-
flict: the ‘vertical’ dimension of Europeanization was 
weak. This points in the direction of a vicious circle be-
tween a low visibility of national parties in EU related 
news and electoral losses for parties who relatively 
strongly emphasize EU related issues, most often in-
cumbent government parties. Months of prolonged 
news about path breaking party stances on EU related 
issues, such as the 2015 EU immigrant crisis, can possi-
bly offer an escape from such a downward cycle, and 
create the momentum to break the vicious circle. 
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